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THE "ACCIDENTAL PROCREATION" ARGUMENT FOR
WITHHOLDING LEGAL RECOGNITION FOR SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS
EDWARD STEIN*
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, advocates of rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender (LGBT) people in the United States have been using litiga-
tion as a central part of the attempt to obtain legal recognition for relation-
ships between couples consisting of two people of the same sex. One of the
primary arguments that states (and the amicus curiae briefs filed in their
support) have made in defense of withholding legal recognition from rela-
tionships between same-sex couples involves procreation. Arguments in-
volving procreation have been accepted by courts that have upheld the
legality and constitutionality of prohibiting marriage between people of the
same sex. According to what I call the standard argument from procrea-
tion, the institution of marriage crucially involves procreation; therefore,
because couples consisting of two people of the same sex simply cannot
procreate, same-sex couples should not be able to marry. While this argu-
ment is still embraced in some contexts, this direct argument from procrea-
tion to the non-recognition of relationships between people of the same sex
is now widely seen as weak, even by some opponents of legal recognition
for same-sex relationships and, apparently, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia. 1
In place of the standard argument from procreation, a new argument
against such legal recognition has emerged that also involves procreation. I
call this new argument the accidental procreation argument. This argument
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focuses on a specific difference between couples consisting of people of the
same sex and those consisting of people of different sexes: namely, that the
latter-but not the former-can accidentally procreate. Because of this risk
of accidental procreation, proponents of this argument conclude that it is
permissible for the state to provide different-sex couples with the opportu-
nity to marry without providing the same opportunity to same-sex couples.
The accidental procreation argument seems to have been first made in a
dissenting opinion in 2003 and then embraced by the majority in an appel-
late decision in 2005. It has since been embraced by majorities in two state
supreme courts and one federal appellate court as well as by other judges.
This Article critically examines this newly-minted procreation-based argu-
ment for prohibiting legal recognition of same-sex relationships, arguing
that it suffers from many of the same flaws as the standard argument from
procreation.
I. PROCREATION AND THE PROHIBITION OF MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES BEFORE 20052
On May 18, 1970, Jack Baker and Michael McConnell filed an appli-
cation for a marriage license in Minnesota. At the time, Baker was finish-
ing his first year of law school at the University of Minnesota. McConnell,
who had been romantically involved with Baker for almost three years, had
recently moved to the Twin Cities after receiving an offer to work as a
librarian for the same university (the University later rescinded McCon-
nell's job offer because of McConnell's attempt to marry Baker).3 Shortly
after they filed an application for a marriage license, the county attorney
denied it. Undeterred, Baker and McConnell sued the county clerk for de-
nying their application. Baker and McConnell argued, first, that Minnesota
law did not explicitly limit marriage to different-sex couples and, thus, their
marriage was not statutorily prohibited.4 In the alternative, they argued that
if Minnesota law was interpreted to prohibit the marriage of two people of
the same sex, the law was unconstitutional. In particular, they argued that
the denial of their opportunity to marry violated the fundamental right to
marry, the right to free speech, and the right to equal protection of the law,
2. The first several paragraphs of this Part are adapted from my essay, The Story of Goodridge v,
Department of Public Health: The Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, in FAMILY LAW
STORIES 27, 28-35 (Carol Sanger, ed. 2008).
3. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 194-95 (8th Cir. 1971).
4. The relevant Minnesota law did not explicitly say that a man could only marry a woman and
that a woman could only marry a man; rather it simply said that "[e]very male person who has attained
the full age of 21 years, and every female person who has attained the full age of 18 years, is capable in
law of contracting marriage, if otherwise competent." MINN. ST. § 517.02 (1967).
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and that this denial constituted cruel and unusual punishment and a depri-
vation of liberty and property without due process. 5
Within a year or so, similar arguments, plus some other ones, were
made in Kentucky by Marjorie Jones (a mother of three children) and her
partner Tracy Knight, and in Washington by John Singer (a typist for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) and Paul Barwick (a Viet-
nam veteran and former state patrol dispatcher). Singer, like McConnell,
lost his job because of his public attempt to marry another man.6 All three
of these early attempts to achieve same-sex marriage through litigation
failed. None of the more than ten judges that considered challenges to the
prohibition of same-sex marriage in the 1970s decided the cases in favor of
the same-sex couples; all of the plaintiffs' arguments were rejected.
Courts offered three main reasons for rejecting the arguments for mar-
riage between two people of the same sex. First, courts looked to the stan-
dard definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, citing
dictionaries, 7 custom, 8 the Bible,9 and to statutory language that referred to
"bride and groom," "husband and wife," and "the male" and "the fe-
male." 10 Courts appealed to the standard definition of marriage to resist the
argument that gender-neutral marriage statutes allowed for same-sex mar-
riage. Further, courts used such definitional arguments as an all-purpose
answer to arguments for same-sex marriage. For example, the Kentucky
court said that Jones and Knight were "prevented from marrying, not by the
statutes of Kentucky... but rather by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined" and that "the relationship proposed
by [Jones and Knight] does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license
because what they propose is not a marriage."' "I
Second, courts denied that the fundamental right to marry extends to
same-sex couples. The court in Jones said "[w]e find no constitutional
sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same
sex."12 Similarly, the Baker court said that "[t]he due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring [marriage] by
5. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (en banc).
6. Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir, 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034
(1977).
7. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186 &
n.1.
8. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
9. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
10. Id.; Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 & n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
11. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589-90; see also Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196 ("[T]hey were denied a
marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself.").
12. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590.
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judicial legislation."' 13
Third, and most importantly for this Article, courts justified the differ-
ential treatment of same-sex and different-sex couples because sexual rela-
tions between the latter, but not the former, had procreative potential. The
Baker court quoted a classic 1942 U.S. Supreme Court case that said,
"Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race." 14 The court buttressed this argument with a biblical ref-
erence, saying that "[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and
woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a
family, is as old as the book of Genesis."'15 Further, while acknowledging
that some heterosexuals cannot procreate or chose not to do so, the Baker
court said that the relationship between the ability to procreate and the pos-
sibility to marry was "no more than theoretically imperfect" and, thus, sur-
vived scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 16 The Singer court
provided the most detailed analysis of the relationship between marriage
and procreation:
[T]he state's refusal to grant a license allowing the appellants to marry
one another is ... based upon the state's recognition that our society as a
whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for pro-
creation and the rearing of children. This is true even though married
couples are not required to become parents and even though some cou-
ples are incapable of becoming parents and even though not all couples
who produce children are married. These, however, are exceptional
situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal insti-
tution primarily because of societal values associated with the propaga-
tion of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no same-sex couple
offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union.' 7
The Singer court continued:
For constitutional purposes, it is enough to recognize that marriage as
now defined is deeply rooted in our society. Although ... married per-
sons are not required to have children or even to engage in sexual rela-
tions, marriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affording a
favorable environment for the growth of children that we are unable to
say that there is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the
protection of its marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one
woman. 18
Relatedly, the Singer court also argued that the different treatment of same-
sex and different-sex couples was justified because a heterosexual marriage
13. Baker, 191 N.W.2dat 186,
14. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 187; see also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
17. Singer, 522 P.2dat 1195.
18. Id. at 1197.
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provided a better context for raising children.19
The basic logic of the standard argument from procreation for the pro-
hibition of same-sex marriages is characterized as follows:
1. Marriage uniquely and crucially involves procreation.
2. Same-sex couples cannot procreate.
3. Therefore, same-sex couples should not be able to marry.20
The courts that embrace this argument realize that some people who
cannot or will not procreate are allowed to marry, but these courts deny that
this fact is a serious threat to the first premise of the standard argument
from procreation. Intuitively, in embracing the standard argument from
procreation, these courts are impressed by the fact that there is the possibil-
ity that a couple consisting of a man and a woman can procreate, while no
such possibility exists for couples consisting of two men or two women.
The procreative potential of different-sex couples distinguishes them from
same-sex couples, and, according to the standard argument from procrea-
tion, that distinction justifies excluding same-sex couples from marriage. 21
It is useful to contrast and set aside a related, but conceptually distinct,
argument for the prohibition of same-sex marriage according to which cou-
ples consisting of people of the same sex are worse parents than couples
19. Id. at 1195.
20. The same argument form can be used more generally against allowing non-marital legal
recognition of same-sex relationships, namely, civil unions (as in New Jersey) or robust domestic
partnerships (as in Oregon and California):
Al. Legal recognition of spouse-like relationships uniquely and crucially involves procrea-
tion.
A2. Same-sex couples cannot procreate.
A3. Therefore, the state should not provide spouse-like legal recognition to same-sex cou-
ples.
In the discussion that follows, I will focus on the standard argument from procreation as applied to
same-sex marriage, but almost all of what I will say applies to the standard argument from procreation
as applied to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships generally.
21. For articulations of the standard argument from procreation, see, for example, WILLIAM J.
BENNETT, THE BROKEN HEARTH: REVERSING THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 133-
34 (2001) ("The timeless function of marriage is child-bearing and child-rearing.... The fact that
homosexual marriages would be intrinsically nonprocreative ought to tell us something significant all
by itself."); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-
Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771
(2001); Amy L. Wax, The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059, 1077-79 (2005). For an especially interesting and insight-
ful analysis of the standard argument from procreation as well as the accidental procreation argument
by focusing on the idea of same-sex relationships as "fraudulent," see Courtney Megan Cahill, The
Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the Law's Procreationist Vision of Marriage,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393 (2007).
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consisting of people of different sexes. This argument, which I call the
"gays make bad parents" argument, was embraced in some form by all
three appellate courts that heard challenges to prohibitions against same-
sex marriages in the 1970s. This argument remained one of the most com-
mon arguments made by opponents of legal recognition for relationships
between people of the same sex.22 The "gays make bad parents" argument,
however, faces two serious objections. First, no difference that matters to
the well being of children exists between having two parents of the same
sex and having two parents of different sexes. In other words, there is no
respectable evidence that same-sex couples are worse parents than differ-
ent-sex couples.23
The second objection to the "gays make bad parents" argument is that,
even if evidence that same-sex couples were worse parents than different-
sex couples existed, the argument that starts with such evidence as a prem-
ise and concludes that same-sex couples should not be allowed to get mar-
ried is invalid. No state looks to whether two intended spouses are likely to
be good parents as a condition for allowing them to marry. "Deadbeat"
parents and prisoners are allowed to marry, as the Supreme Court has said
that laws prohibiting these groups of people from marrying are unconstitu-
tional.24 This is not to say that people who have at one time been unable to
provide financial support for their offspring or who have been prisoners are
always or usually bad parents. However, at least as much reason exists for
thinking that these types of people will be bad parents as exists for thinking
that LGBT people will be bad parents, and, yet, prisoners and "deadbeats"
22. For recent court opinions that embrace the "gays make bad parents" argument, see, for exam-
ple, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 527-28 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J., dissenting);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 998-1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion); Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of such arguments made in the legisla-
tive context of attempts to pass a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one
man and one woman, see Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 658-60 (2004).
23. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, LESBIAN & GAY PARENTING 15 (2005), available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/publications/lgparenting.pdf ("Evidence to date suggests that home envi-
ronments provided by gay and lesbian parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to
support and enable children's psychosocial growth."); Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring
with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998);
Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A Social Science
Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607, 613 (2006) ("[S]tudies comparing children raised by sexual
minority parents with those raised by otherwise comparable heterosexual parents have not found reli-
able disparities in mental health or social adjustment."); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How)
Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159 (2001); Fiona Tasker, Lesbian
Mothers, Gay Fathers, and Their Children: A Review, 26 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS
224, 238 (2005).
24. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (parents who fail to meet court-mandated child
support obligations, a.k.a. "deadbeat" parents); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prisoners).
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are allowed to marry while, in most jurisdictions, LGBT people are not.
Responding to the "gays make bad parents" argument is not, however,
my main project here, even though this argument is connected to arguments
against same-sex marriage that focus on procreation. Henceforth, I set aside
the "gays make bad parents" argument and related arguments about the
quality of parenting to focus more directly on procreation-based arguments.
Courts in the United States began to reject the standard argument from
procreation starting in the late 1990s. In 1996, a trial judge in Hawaii ruled
that none of the state's proffered justifications for prohibiting couples of
the same sex from marrying-which included the protection of the health
and welfare of children and the fostering of procreation within a marital
setting25-warranted withholding the legal status of marriage from same-
sex couples.26 Similarly, as explained by the Supreme Court of Vermont in
1999, "The principal purpose... advance[d] in support of... excluding
same-sex couples from the legal benefits of marriage [was] the govern-
ment's interest in 'furthering the link between procreation and child rear-
ing.' 27 That court rejected this interest for being under-inclusive because
"[t]he law extends the benefits and protections of marriage to many persons
with no logical connection to the stated governmental goal" 28 of furthering
the link between procreation and child-rearing, and, more generally, for
failing to "provide ... a reasonable and just basis for the continued exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a civil marriage li-
cense under Vermont law."'29
Perhaps the strongest rejection of the standard argument from procrea-
tion came in Massachusetts in 2003. In his brief defending the constitution-
ality of the state's refusal to allow same-sex couples to get married,
Massachusetts's attorney general stated that "the primary purpose for [the]
regulation [of marriage] is to provide a favorable setting for procreation. 30
He further argued that, from a constitutional perspective, this purpose is "at
least rational, if not compelling."'31 The majority of Massachusetts's highest
25. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3, (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996),
rev'd, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed
the decision of the trial court in light of an amendment to Hawaii's constitution that gave the state
legislature the power to "reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples" HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998).
The analysis of the trial court discussed in the text was not rejected by the Hawaii Supreme Court;
rather, the analysis was rendered moot by this constitutional amendment.
26. Baehr, 1996WL694235,at*16-22.
27. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 886.
30. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 111, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860).
31. Id.
2009] 409
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court rejected this argument as follows:
Our laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual in-
tercourse between married people above every other form of adult inti-
macy and every other means of creating a family. [They] contain.. . no
requirement that the applicants for a marriage license attest to their abil-
ity or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a condition
of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. People who have never con-
summated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and stay married.
People who cannot stir from their deathbed may marry. While it is cer-
tainly true that many, perhaps most, married couples have children to-
gether (assisted or unassisted), it is the exclusive and permanent
commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of
children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.
Moreover, the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing
children into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is mar-
ried or unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into a family,
whether assistive technology was used to conceive the child, and
whether the parent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisex-
ual. If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our
statutes would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of
nonmarital child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital means.
The attempt to isolate procreation as "the source of a fundamental right
to marry" overlooks the integrated way in which courts have examined
the complex and overlapping realms of personal autonomy, marriage,
family life, and child rearing. 32
Even Justice Scalia-a dissenter in two of the most important LGBT
rights cases heard by the Supreme Court33-acknowledged the weakness of
the standard argument from procreation. As part of criticizing the majority
and concurring opinions in Lawrence v. Texas for "effectively decree[ing]
the end to all moral legislation,"34 Scalia argued that the logic of these
opinions would lead to same-sex marriages, saying that, after this decision,
"what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of mar-
riage to homosexual couples ... ? Surely not the encouragement of pro-
creation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry." 35
In the 1970s, the standard argument from procreation was one of the
leading arguments made by states and accepted by courts. 36 By the middle
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, some states did not even
32. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961-62 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted); see also Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901-02 (Iowa 2009).
33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 605.
36. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 154
(2004) (noting that procreation was the "most common state interest.., in same-sex marriage case[s]").
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make the argument from procreation when defending the prohibition of
same-sex marriage. 37 What happened between the 1970s and the 1990s that
led states to stop making and courts to start rejecting the direct argument
between marriage and procreation? 38
Part of the answer to this question is that the attitudes and practices re-
lating to marriage, sex, and procreation changed. These and related social
changes led to increased acceptance of the ideas that marriage does not
require procreation and that procreation can occur outside of marriage.
These changes are due, in part, to the increased availability, use, and social
acceptance of contraception since the late 1960s. 39 Also, people are living
longer, women continue to have a longer average lifespan than men,40 and
divorce and remarriage have become more socially acceptable. 41 Partly as a
result of these trends, women are, on average, getting married later in life.42
Additionally, more people are cohabitating and having children outside of
marriage. 43 Finally, because of advances in reproductive technologies and
the emergence of social networks and commercial enterprises that support
various forms of surrogacy arrangements, more people who want to procre-
ate are doing so, often outside of marriage. Different-sex couples who were
deemed "sterile" in the past may be able to procreate thanks to new repro-
ductive technologies. 44 The same is true for same-sex couples and single
37. See, e.g., In re Marriages Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430 (Cal. 2008) (noting that the argument from
procreation was made in an amicus brief, not by the state); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 477-48 (Conn. 2008) ("[D]efendants expressly have disavowed any claim that ... prohibit-
ing same sex couples from marrying promotes responsible heterosexual procreation .... "); Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006) ("The State does not argue that limiting marriage to the union of
a man and a woman is needed to encourage procreation or to create the optimal living environment for
children.").
38. Some judges have recently embraced the standard argument. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior
Court, 77 P.3d 451, 462 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 515 (Zarella, J., dissenting);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1002 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting);
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983
(Wash. 2006).
39. See, e.g., William D. Mosher & Christine A. Bachrach, First Premarital Contraceptive Use:
United States, 1960-82, 18 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 83 (1987).
40. See, e.g., Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2004, CDC NAT'L VITAL STATS. REPS.,
Dec. 28, 2007, at 30 tbl. 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56-09.pdf.
41. See, e.g., J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997).
42. See, e.g., ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001, at 3, 4 thl. 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2005pubs/p70-97.pdf (indicating that women born in the early 1970s married at an older age on average
than women born in the late 1930s).
43. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007); Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An
Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 1 (2000).
44. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 25-35 (2008) (showing use of artificial insemination in
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people who now may avail themselves of sperm donors, egg donors, in
vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy.45 In short, in the last few dec-
ades, the gap between marriage and procreation has dramatically widened.
These social changes are synergistically related to legal changes:
courts have found that laws prohibiting contraception are unconstitu-
tional;46 the divorce process has become much easier (especially because of
the move from fault to no-fault divorce); 47 courts have recognized cohabi-
tation for some legal purposes; 48 non-marital legal relationships have been
created; 49 courts have upheld surrogacy agreements; 50 people who are not
the "biological" parents of their children are listed as the parents on the
birth certificates; 51 and, more generally, the notion of who counts as a par-
ent has been expanded. 52 Further, courts now acknowledge that same-sex
couples do, in fact, procreate, at least in some sense of the term. As a New
Jersey court observed, "reproductive science and technology [now enable]
some persons in committed same-sex relationships [to] legally and func-
the United States).
45. See, e.g., id. at 32-33.
46. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. See, e.g., J. DIFONZO, supra note 41.
48. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing oral or implied cohabitation
contracts); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994) (applying bystander liability to unmarried
different-sex cohabitant); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing same-
sex cohabitant as family member under housing law).
49. Three states (Vermont, New Jersey, and New Hampshire) now allow same-sex couples to
enter civil unions, which are the legal equivalent to marriages under the respective states' law. See, e.g.,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2007). Starting on September 1, 2009, Vermont began allowing same-
sex couples to marry. S. 115, 2009-10 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009); Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups
Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, NY TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al. Starting on January 1, 2010,
New Hampshire will allow same-sex couples to marry. H. 436, 2009-10 Leg. Sess. (NH 2009). Six
states (California, Colorado, Maine, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington), the District of Columbia, and
various local jurisdictions now allow same-sex couples to register as domestic partners (although
Hawaii calls them reciprocal beneficiaries and Colorado calls them designated beneficiaries). Unless
opponents of same-sex marriage in Maine get enough signatures to force a voter referendum, starting on
September 1, 2009, Maine will allow same-sex couples to marry. S.384, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Me. 2009)
(legalizing same-sex marriages); Matt Wickenheiser, Marriage Fight Looms, MORNING SENTINEL
(Maine), June 18, 2009, at http://momingsentinel.mainetoday.com/news/local/6489971.html. Starting
on October 1, 2009, Nevada will allow same-sex and (unmarried) different-sex couples to register as
domestic partners. S. 283, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2009). Maryland also offers some limited protections
for same-sex couples but does not maintain a domestic partner or similar such registry. See, e.g., S.
785, 2009 Leg. Sess. (Md. 2009) (providing an exemption from the inheritance tax for certain property
that passes from a decedent to the domestic partner of a decedent).
50. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess
Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001).
51. See, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B, 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Belsito v. Clark,
644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
52. See, e.g., Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (three parents); C.E.W. v.
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (de facto parent); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2007) (three parents); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (de facto parent).
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tionally procreate. '53
These sociological and legal changes have enabled some courts to
recognize the problems with the standard argument from procreation. No
longer do most courts see the separation of marriage and procreation as
"exceptional. '54 Today, most courts seem to understand that the standard
argument from procreation faces the problem that no state requires that
couples intend to procreate or even be able to procreate in order to marry.55
Women at an age that suggests they have gone through menopause are still
allowed to marry. Infertile men, people who are on their deathbeds, and
prisoners serving life sentences with no chance of parole or conjugal visits
are allowed to marry.56 In several jurisdictions, in fact, there are even spe-
cially crafted marriage laws for couples who cannot procreate. Wisconsin,
for example, allows first cousins to marry if the woman is over fifty-five
years old or if either party to the marriage is sterile. 57
Returning to the logical form of the standard argument from procrea-
tion, courts now recognize that premise (1) is false, because, first, procrea-
tion is no longer seen as crucial for marriage now that society has embraced
53. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Collester, J., dissenting)
modified, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) ("[C]hildren
are being conceived by [same-sex couples] through a variety of assisted-reproductive techniques.");
Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *14 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004), rev'd,
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
54. In 1974 the Washington Appellate Court stated in defense of the argument from procreation
that while some married couples cannot have children and some couples who have children are not
married, such situations are "exceptional." Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
55. See Varmum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d. 862, 901-02 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961-64 (Mass. 2003); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 31-32 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the "encouragement of procreation" cannot be a reason for denying same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage).
56. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1986) (holding that prisoners can marry).
57. See Wis. STAT. § 765.03(1) (2007); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(B) (2007)
("first cousins may marry if both are sixty-five years of age or older or if one or both first cousins are
under sixty-five years of age, upon approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has been
presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable to reproduce"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/212 (West 2008); IND. CODE § 31-11-8-3 (2008); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (2008). Such laws
have an affinity to laws that prohibited marriage by people with certain mental or physical conditions
unless they were over a certain age. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1354 (repealed 1969) ("Every man
and woman, either of whom is epileptic, imbecile, or feeble-minded, who shall intermarry, or live
together as husband and wife, when the woman is under forty-five years of age, shall be imprisoned not
more than three years."); KAN. STAT. ANN. 23-210 (repealed 1977) (prohibiting women under forty-five
from marrying if they or their spouse is epileptic, an imbecile, feeble-minded or afflicted with insanity
as well as prohibiting women who were children of insane people from marrying until age forty-five).
Somewhat similar laws still are on the books in a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1304(c) (2008) ("No marriage license may be issued if either of the applicants for a license is weak
minded, insane, of unsound mind or is under guardianship as a person of unsound mind unless the court
decides that it is for the best interest of the applicant and the general public to issue the license and
authorizes the issuance of the license.").
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the companionate view of marriage, and, second, many cohabitating differ-
ent-sex couples are procreating and, depending on how procreation is de-
fined, single people are procreating. 58 Further, as noted above, many courts
now acknowledge that premise (2) is false, because, in addition to differ-
ent-sex couples and single people, same-sex couples are producing chil-
dren. 59
In addition, some courts also seem to recognize that the standard ar-
gument from procreation is also invalid. To see this invalidity, consider the
following argument (or similar arguments involving infertile men or people
on their deathbeds) that is isomorphic to the standard argument from pro-
creation:
4. Marriage uniquely and crucially involves procreation.
5. Women over sixty-five years of age cannot procreate.
6. Therefore, women over sixty-five years of age should not be
able to marry.
Every jurisdiction, however, allows women over sixty-five to get mar-
ried. Therefore, one of the premises of this argument is false or the argu-
ment is invalid. Advocates of the standard argument for procreation need to
accept premise (4)-this premise is crucial to their argument against same-
sex marriage-and they cannot deny premise (5). Thus, they are left with
an apparent dilemma. The advocates could either (i) accept (6), which is a
radical conclusion, particularly because no jurisdiction accepts it, and it
probably violates the fundamental right to marriage of women over sixty-
five, or (ii) they could grant that the logical step from premises (4) and (5)
to (6) is invalid. However, the latter alternative is not appealing to oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage since this would seem to entail that the similar
logical step from premises (1) and (2) to (3) is also invalid.
Some legal commentators have responded to analogies like this one
involving same-sex couples on the one hand, and different-sex couples
involving women over sixty-five on the other, by pointing to what they
think is the crucial difference between different-sex couples who cannot
procreate and same-sex couples. They say that even though neither type of
couple can procreate, infertile different-sex couples, but not same-sex cou-
ples, can engage in "reproductive-type" acts, that is, acts of the type that
58. See LOUISE SLOAN, KNOCK YOURSELF UP: NO MAN? NO PROBLEM! (2007) (single mothers
by choice); Mireya Navarro, The Bachelor Life Includes a Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at STI
(single fathers by choice).
59. See cases cited supra note 53.
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sometimes lead to procreation. 60 According to John Finnis, couples partici-
pate in what he calls "the marital form of life":
[B]ecause they can make every commitment and can form and carry out
every intention that any other married couple need make, form, and carry
out in order to be validly married and to fulfill all their marital responsi-
bilities. By their model of fidelity within a relationship involving acts of
the reproductive kind (and no other sex acts), these infertile marriages
are, moreover, strongly supportive of marriage as a valuable social insti-
tution.6 1
On Finnis's view, the crucial difference between infertile different-sex
couples and same-sex couples that explains why the former, but not the
latter, should be able to marry is that some of the sex acts in which infertile
different-sex couples engage are of the "reproductive" sort even though,
since they are infertile, their sex acts cannot in fact be reproductive.
In response, I note that a same-sex couple in Massachusetts, Iowa, or
Connecticut-the three states at present where same-sex couples can le-
gally marry (same-sex couples will also soon be able to marry in New
Hampshire,Vermont, and, depending on the outcome of a petition drive, in
Maine)-has the same potential to "participate in the marital form of life"
as does the infertile different-sex couple except, to be blunt, for engaging in
"penis-penetrates-vagina" sex. Procreative capacity aside, what is special
about penis-vagina sex as compared to "penis-penetrates-anus," "penis-
penetrates-mouth," or "tongue-penetrates-vagina" sex? Finnis's focus on
"penis-penetrates-vagina" sex seems arbitrary, once the procreative capac-
ity of such sex is not at issue. Further, some different-sex couples cannot
engage in penis-penetrates-vagina sex and are still allowed to marry. Men
who have been castrated and women who suffer from vaginismus-a con-
dition involving involuntary tightness of the vagina during attempted inter-
course caused by involuntary contractions of the pelvic floor surrounding
the vagina-are still allowed to marry even though they cannot engage in
penis-penetrates-vagina sex. 62 The response of Finnis and others to the
60. See, e.g., John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some
Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JuRIS. 97, 128 (1997); Patrick Lee & Robert P.
George, What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 150
(1997). In a similar vein, Justice Cordy's dissent in Goodridge talks about limiting marriage to couples
who could "at least theoretically procreate," attempting to include infertile different-sex couples in the
group of couples who can marry while excluding same-sex couples. 798 N.E.2d at 1002 & n.35 (Cordy,
J., dissenting); see also BENNETT, supra note 21, at 133.
61. Finnis, supra note 60, at 132 (emphasis omitted).
62. See, e.g., T. v. M., 242 A.2d 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968); Vanden Berg v. Van-
den Berg, 197 N.Y.S. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923). In both of these cases, the courts granted an annulment
to a husband whose wife suffered from vaginismus. There was, however, nothing preventing the men in
these cases from staying married to their wives and seeking sexual pleasure with them through other
marital sex acts or staying married to their wives and simply not having sex with them. The point is
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claim that the standard argument from procreation is invalid thus fails.
When confronted with the dilemma that arises when the standard ar-
gument from procreation is paired with isomorphic arguments like the ar-
gument from premises (4) and (5) to (6), courts until recently treated the
dilemma as insignificant or exceptional, simply rejecting such isomorphic
arguments by taking judicial notice that most marriages involved (non-
assisted) procreation and most procreation took place in the context of mar-
riage.63 Social and legal changes have, however, undercut this defense of
the standard argument from procreation. Today, courts have difficultly
dismissing questions about the truth of the premises and the validity of the
logical form of the standard argument from procreation.64
II. THE "ACCIDENTAL PROCREATION" ARGUMENT AND ITS PROBLEMS
A. The New Argument from Procreation
As courts began to doubt the standard argument from procreation for
the prohibition of same-sex marriages, the accidental procreation argument
emerged. The goal of this new argument is to justify giving the benefits of
marriage to different-sex couples but not same-sex couples by focusing on
the risk of having "unplanned" children. Because states are legitimately
concerned for unplanned children that might result from the accidental
procreation of different-sex couples, a state is justified in offering marriage
exclusively to different-sex couples as incentive for them to get married
and form stable families. The first published judicial opinion to embrace
the accidental procreation argument was Justice Robert Cordy's dissent in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the landmark 2003 Massachu-
setts case that produced the first legal same-sex marriages in the United
States.65 The first majority opinion to make this argument was in 2005 by
an Indiana appellate court in Morrison v. Sadler, where that court upheld
that a woman with vaginismus can still legally marry, even though penis-penetrates-vagina sex is
difficult, painful, or impossible for them.
63. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). When courts today accept the
standard procreation argument, they do so as part of a "rational review" analysis. See, e.g., Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 632-34 (Md. 2007); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1002 n.35 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the accidental procreation argument under rational review analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 125-34.
64. For other discussions of the problems with the standard argument from procreation, see, for
example, Laurence Drew Borton, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1089 (2002); Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FL. COSTAL L.
REV. 191, 192-207 (2005); Jamal Greene, Comment, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE
L.J. 1989 (2005).
65. 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
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Indiana's prohibition of same-sex marriages.66 In the following year, the
highest courts of New York and Washington,67 in the context of similar
legal challenges, also embraced this argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit did the same in a case concerning the constitutional-
ity of a Nebraska constitutional amendment that defined marriage as be-
tween one man and one woman and refused recognition to all types of
marriage-like relationships between two people of the same sex. 68 In the
most developed articulation of this argument, the court in Morrison stated:
[There is a] key difference between how most opposite-sex couples be-
come parents, through sexual intercourse, and how all same-sex couples
must become parents, through adoption or assisted reproduction ....
Those persons wanting to have children by assisted reproduction or
adoption are, by necessity, heavily invested, financially and emotionally,
in those processes. Those processes also require a great deal of foresight
and planning. "Natural" procreation, on the other hand, may occur only
between opposite-sex couples and with no foresight or planning. All that
is required is one instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman
to become pregnant.
What does the difference between "natural" reproduction on the one
hand and assisted reproduction and adoption on the other mean for con-
stitutional purposes? It means that it impacts the [s]tate['s] ... clear in-
terest in seeing that children are raised in stable environments. Those
persons who have invested the significant time, effort, and expense asso-
ciated with assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very likely
to be able to provide such an environment, with or without the "protec-
tions" of marriage, because of the high level of financial and emotional
commitment exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in the
first place.
By contrast, procreation by "natural" reproduction may occur with-
out any thought for the future. The State... may legitimately create the
institution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it, in
order to encourage male-female couples to procreate within the legiti-
macy and stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage
unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from "casual" inter-
66. See 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
67. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion); Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring). The reasoning in Andersen, for
example, was as follows:
Unlike same-sex couples, only opposite-sex couples may experience unintentional or un-
planned procreation. State sanctioned marriage as a union of one man and one woman en-
courages couples to enter into a stable relationship prior to having children and to remain
committed to one another in the relationship for the raising of children, planned or otherwise.
Id. See also Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 518-20 (Conn. 2008) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting).
68. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (.'[R]esponsible pro-
creation' theory ... justifies conferring the inducements of marital recognition and benefits on oppo-
site-sex couples, who can otherwise produce children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who
cannot.").
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course.... The institution of marriage not only encourages opposite-sex
couples to form a relatively stable environment for the "natural" procrea-
tion of children .... it also encourages them to stay together and raise a
child or children together if there is a "change in plans."
One of the State's key interests in supporting opposite-sex marriage
is [to] ... encourage.., opposite-sex couples who, by definition, are the
only type of couples that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex
with little or no contemplation of the consequences that might result, i.e.
a child, to procreate responsibly.69
Also, in the New York case upholding the constitutionality of New
York's prohibition on same-sex marriage, in part, because of the accidental
procreation argument, the plurality opinion of the state's highest court said
the following:
Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of
children; homosexual intercourse does not.... The Legislature
could.., find that [sexual] relationships [between a man and a woman]
are all too often casual or temporary. It could find that an important func-
tion of marriage is to create more stability and permanence in the rela-
tionships that cause children to be bom. It thus could choose to offer an
inducement-in the form of marriage and its attendant benefits-to op-
posite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each
other. 70
The accidental procreation argument draws on actual biological dif-
ferences between men and women to distinguish same-sex couples and
different-sex couples: because of the different structure of the male and
female reproductive systems, couples consisting of one man and one
woman are at risk of accidentally procreating, while couples consisting of
two people of the same sex are not. According to this argument, the state
can respond to the distinctive risk facing male-female couples by providing
incentives 71 for them to form stable relationships that will provide stable
69. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).
70. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 21-22 (Graffeo, J., concurring)
stating that:
It is not irrational for the Legislature to provide an incentive for opposite-sex couples-for
whom children may be conceived from casual, even momentary intimate relationships-to
marry, create a family environment, and support their children. Although many same-sex
couples share these family objectives and are competently raising children in a stable envi-
ronment, they are simply not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in this regard given
the intrinsic differences in the assisted reproduction or adoption processes that most homo-
sexual couples rely on to have children.
Id. The Hemandez plurality consisted of three out of six judges (R. Smith, Read, and G. Smith) who sat
for this case. See id. Two judges (Kaye and Ciparick) dissented and one judge (Graffeo) wrote a concur-
rence, which was joined by one of the two judges (G. Smith) who joined the plurality opinion. See id.
71. There are over a thousand federal laws for which marital status is a factor. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4353r.pdf (updating GAO/OGC-97-16, DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf). Also, in New
York, for example, statutes and regulations confer over 1300 legal rights and duties on married indi-
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environments for children in case accidental procreation occurs. The focus
on actual differences between men and women is useful because such dif-
ferences seem unassailable; the U.S. Supreme Court has cited such actual
differences, although in limited contexts, as surviving constitutional scru-
tiny.72 As such, this argument has the potential to take the place of the
standard argument from procreation as a way of justifying access to mar-
riage for different-sex couples, but not for same-sex couples.
In his influential article, The Channeling Function in Family Law,
Carl Schneider focused on how family law is in some sense a form of so-
cial engineering. 73 By creating the legal institution of marriage, providing
certain rights, benefits, duties, and responsibilities that go along with it, and
offering other incentives to enter into marriages, states encourage and so-
cialize people to get married. According to the accidental procreation ar-
gument, the central aim of marriage law is to channel different-sex couples
into stable living situations in order to best provide for any unplanned chil-
dren.
The logical form of the accidental procreation argument is more com-
plicated and harder to characterize than the standard argument from pro-
creation. The accidental procreation argument focuses on the relative risks
of accidental procreation for different-sex couples as compared to same-sex
couples. The argument also appeals to a state's interest in providing chil-
dren with stable living environments, the role that marriage plays in en-
couraging such stability, and the claim that couples who have children
through planning thereby provide such children with a stable environment.
Thus, the logical form of this argument could be characterized as follows:
7. Different-sex couples sometimes procreate without intend-
ing to procreate.
8. Same-sex couples cannot procreate without intending to
procreate.
9. The state has an important interest in child rearing, with a
particular focus on trying to keep children out of unstable
living situations.
viduals. See EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA & NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N, 1324 REASONS FOR
MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN NEW YORK STATE (2007), available at http://www.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/marriage-v7d2 I.pdf.
72. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding different requirements for citizenship for
children of unmarried women who are US citizens as compared to children of unmarried men who are
US citizens); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding draft registration for men but not
women); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape laws under
which men but not women could be found criminally liable).
73. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495 (1992).
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10. Marriage increases the chances of stability for those who en-
ter into it.
11. People who plan to have children are more likely to be able
to provide the children that result with a stable environment
whether or not they are married.
12. Therefore, the state can restrict marriage to different-sex
couples.
The next section of this Part explores the connection between the ac-
cidental procreation argument and sociobiology, the multidisciplinary field
of study that uses evolutionary theory to try to explain social behaviors of
all species by focusing on the selective advantage of such behaviors. The
subsequent section reviews several criticisms of the accidental procreation
argument, showing that this argument faced some of the same problems
faces by the standard argument from procreation, as well as some distinc-
tive problems.
B. The "Sociobiological" Connection
The accidental procreation argument has a noteworthy affinity with
sociobiological accounts of the differences between men and women and
the role marriage plays in providing a stable environment for children.
Consider this typical sociobiological account of the difference between
men and women:
Males ... [have] small sex cells, females ... [have] the large sex cells.
The large female gametes remain reasonably stationary and come loaded
with nutrients. The small male gametes are endowed with mobility and
swimming speed. Along with differences in the size and mobility of the
sex cells comes a difference ... in quantity. Men, for example, produce
millions of sperm, which are replenished at the rate of roughly twelve
million per hour, while women produce a fixed and unreplenishable life-
time supply of approximately four hundred ova.
Women's greater initial investment does not end with the egg. Fer-
tilization and gestation, key components of human parental investment,
occur internally within women. One act of sexual intercourse, which re-
quires minimal male investment, can produce an obligatory and energy-
consuming nine-month investment by the woman that forecloses other
mating opportunities. Women then bear the exclusive burden of lacta-
tion, an investment that may last as long as three or four years. 74
Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists-who, like sociobi-
ologists, try to use evolutionary theory to explain human behavior, but
74. DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 19-20 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
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instead they do so by focusing on how evolution shaped the mental mecha-
nisms that cognitive science studies-suggest that these biological differ-
ences between men and women have important behavioral, psychological,
and social consequences. The following analysis offers a standard sociobi-
ological account:
Evolutionary theory predicts that several important consequences
will follow [from biological sex differences] .... [M]ales as a rule have a
good deal more to gain by competing for mates. A Don Juan can theo-
retically become a father every night .... There is strong selection pres-
sure to acquire ... both the power to charm the ladies and the power to
conquer other males .... As a result males are typically more reckless
and ostentatious than females, and extremely intolerant of being
cheated....
[For females,] it is to their advantage to be more discriminating:
flirtatious to attract many suitors, but also hesitant, socially skilled, and
perceptive in order to mate with ... [the males] most competent in deal-
ing with other males and ... most likely to devote himself [to childrear-
ing].75
In light of the different reproductive systems of men and women and
the evolutionary history behind such differences, some have argued that
marriage plays an important role in reducing the likelihood that men will
abandon the women with whom they have sex. As one popularizer of evo-
lutionary psychology put it:
If we ... hypothetically accept the Darwinian view that men (con-
sciously or unconsciously) want as many sex-providing and child-
making machines as they can comfortably afford, and women (con-
sciously or unconsciously) want to maximize the resources available to
their children[,] then we may have the key to explaining why
monogam[ous marriage] is with us today.76
Or, as Judge Richard Posner wrote in a book that draws extensively on
sociobiological theory, "It is not heterosexuality that contributes stability
[to a marriage], but the presence of a female. '' 77
Continuing with this sociobiological account, because men sometimes
abandon their female sexual partners and because sex between men and
women can sometimes lead to unintended procreation, women who have
sex with men will often be left to care for their accidentally-produced off-
spring alone. In the words of Justice Cordy's dissenting opinion in Good-
ridge:
75. CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD 0. WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN OF MIND 29-30 (1983) (quotations omitted).
76. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 96 (1994).
77. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 306 (1992) (alteration in original) (citing DONALD
WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 141 (1951)).
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Whereas the relationship between mother and child is demonstratively
and predictably created and recognizable through the biological process
of pregnancy and childbirth, there is no corresponding process for creat-
ing a relationship between father and child. Similarly, aside from an act
of heterosexual intercourse nine months prior to childbirth, there is no
process for creating a relationship between a man and a woman as the
parents of a particular child.78
Because a potentially unstable situation results when a child will be cared
for by one biological parent rather than two, marriage provides a way to
improve the chances of a stable relationship between a father and his off-
spring and the father and the mother of a child. Or, as the same dissent put
it, "marriage ... formally bind[s] the husband-father to his wife and child,
and impos[es] on him the responsibilities of fatherhood. '79
Sometimes a woman can find a man other than her child's biological
father to co-parent with her. Sociobiologists and other researchers have,
however, argued that having a stepfather is a powerful risk factor for severe
child maltreatment, because, according to the evolutionary point of view
adopted by sociobiologists, the stepfather will see the stepchild as compet-
ing with him-and any children he might have-for the care and attention
of his wife.80
The connection to the accidental procreation argument is that, in light
of this or another sort of biological or social scientific theory, a legislature
might believe that children resulting from accidental procreation who live
with their married parents will turn out better than children raised by their
biological mothers living alone or with men (or women) who are not the
fathers of the children. To encourage stable environments for childrearing,
a legislature might, therefore, offer incentives to different-sex couples to
formalize their relationships. Marriage, it has been argued, provides just
such encouragement.
C. Problems with the Accidental Procreation Argument
Various problems face the accidental procreation argument, some of
which parallel the problems with the standard procreation argument. First,
78. Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 996 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA: A DARWINIAN
VIEW OF PARENTAL LOVE (1998) (arguing that having a step-parent is the most powerful risk factor for
severe child maltreatment). For a discussion of some non-sociobiological evidence for the conclusion
that children living with a step-parent do less well the children living with both biological parents see,
for example, Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REv.
377, 402-06 (2006).
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many couples who, in fact, are allowed to marry cannot accidentally pro-
create. Infertile couples, for example, are allowed to marry, but there is no
risk that they will accidentally procreate. Similarly, there are different-sex
couples who, while not infertile, require medical intervention in order to
procreate. These couples are not at risk of procreating accidentally, and,
yet, they are allowed to marry. Further, even prisoners who have no chance
of parole or conjugal visits-and thus who have no opportunity to engage
in behaviors that could lead to accidental procreation-are permitted to get
married. 81 These and similar examples create a problem for the accidental
procreation argument. According to this argument, a state may prohibit
same-sex couples from marrying because same-sex couples cannot acci-
dentally procreate, but infertile couples-some of whom could be easily
identified at the time they apply for a marriage license (for example, cou-
ples that include women over sixty-five)-are not prohibited from marry-
ing. This problem parallels the problem that the standard argument from
procreation has regarding infertile couples and the like.82
Second, although same-sex couples cannot accidentally procreate,
they can, in various ways, wind-up having to take care of children without
having planned to be parents. For example, suppose that Adam and Steve
are a same-sex couple and that Adam's sister, Eve, and her husband desig-
nate Adam and Steve as the guardians of their young children if they
should die. If Eve and her husband unexpectedly die, Adam and Steve
could find themselves unexpectedly the guardians of these children (in
states that allow second-parent adoption, that is, adoption by two people of
the same sex, Adam and Steve could jointly adopt these children). 83 If mar-
riage is supposed to improve the chances of a stable environment for unex-
pected children, then why do most states fail to provide that same chance at
a more stable environment to the unexpected children of parents of the
same sex? Why should a state offer marriage as an incentive for only a
subset of the class of parents of unexpected children-children who result
from accidental procreation-when other accidental children have the very
same need for a stable environment as the children of accidental procrea-
tion? To return to my hypothetical, if marriage provides stability to rela-
tionships, it would be potentially useful for Eve's children if Adam and
Steve were married, as marriage could contribute to the stability of Adam
and Steve's relationship and, thus, to the stability of the environment in
81. Tumerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95 (1987).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
83. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397
(N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
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which Eve's children unexpectedly find themselves.
Third, there is another, more serious, problem for the accidental pro-
creation argument related to same-sex couples who act as parents. If, ac-
cording to the accidental procreation argument, the goal of marriage is to
provide stability for children, then, even though the parents of same-sex
couples are more "heavily invested" in their children because of what
same-sex couples need to do to have children,84 children of same-sex cou-
ples still need the stability that comes from having parents who are married.
Just like relationships between different-sex couples, relationships between
same-sex couples sometimes come to an end. When relationships break up
and children are involved, the legal status that comes with marriage helps
provide stability for children. If, for example, two women living together in
a relationship decide to have children and one of them-the bio-mother-is
inseminated and, as a result, subsequently has a child, in some jurisdictions,
unless the two women are married, in a civil union or in a domestic part-
nership or unless the non-bio-mother has adopted the child, then the non-
bio-mother's relationship with the child is that of a legal stranger. This
scenario has, unfortunately, been played out many times, and the result is
instability for children: a child who has developed a parental relationship
with each of his two mothers (his bio-mother and his non-bio-mother, al-
though he probably will not conceptualize his relationships with them in
this way) will be at risk of losing his relationship with his non-bio-mother,
losing the extra security of having two parents to provide emotional and
financial support, and the like. 85 Even in jurisdictions where the non-bio-
mother can adopt the child, for one reason or another, sometimes a child is
not adopted even though the two women are both co-parenting and cohabi-
tating.86 Allowing same-sex couples to marry would provide their children
with improved chances for stability by providing an additional pathway for
a child to have a legal relationship with his or her non-bio-parent.
Fourth, more generally, the accidental procreation argument assumes,
without any evidence, that couples who plan to have children are going to
be better and more stable at raising their children. Couples who adopt or
use reproductive technologies to have children may have invested more
resources and emotional energy in getting their children, but having made a
plan and invested resources to parent is not the same as having good par-
enting skills. Further, it is well established that many forms of assisted
84. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
85. See, e.g., King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005); A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass.
2006); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007).
86. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Jones, 154 P.3d 808; In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
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reproductive techniques can be very stressful and emotionally draining for
the prospective parents. 87 Both adoption and reproductive techniques can
also be quite expensive and time consuming; parents who make use of
these techniques may find themselves in financial difficulty because of the
costs involved. In fact, some people who make use of assisted reproduction
techniques get drawn into the process without appreciating how much it
will eventually cost them. 88 Cost and time considerations are especially
significant for gay male couples, who must find both an egg donor and a
surrogate to gestate the resulting fertilized egg. This problem relates to
premise 11 of the schematic form of the accidental procreation argument in
section A above. Given the costs in terms of time, money, and emotional
energy and the serious stress that can be involved in getting children using
the various forms of assisted reproduction, the children of same-sex cou-
ples who result from planned procreation may sometimes find themselves
in environments that are no more stable than children that result from acci-
dental procreation.
Fifth, even setting aside these first four problems, allowing same-sex
couples to marry would in no way interfere with a state's ability to use
marriage to provide incentives for different-sex couples to enter stable rela-
tionships. The dissent in the New York same-sex marriage case pointed out
that "while encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before they have
children is certainly a legitimate interest of the State, the exclusion of gay
men and lesbians from marriage in no way furthers this interest. There are
enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone." 89 A state can still
incentivize couples at risk of accidentally procreating even if it allows
same-sex couples to marry. The incentives for potential accidental procrea-
tors to marry are the same whether or not same-sex couples can marry.90
87. See, e.g., RONNY DIAMOND, ET AL., COUPLE THERAPY FOR INFERTILITY (1999); FROZEN
DREAMS: PSYCHODYNAMIC DIMENSIONS OF INFERTILITY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (Allison
Rosen & Jay Rosen eds., 2005); ARTHUR L. GREIL, NOT YET PREGNANT (1991); INFERTILITY
COUNSELING: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK FOR CLINICIANS (Sharon Convington & Linda Bums
eds., 2d. ed. 2006).
88. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, The Heart's Desire, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at Fl (discussing the
"fertility vortex").
89. Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); see also Vamum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d. 862, 901-02 (Iowa 2009); Andersen v. King County,138 P.3d 963, 1018 (Wash.
2006) (Faircloth, J., dissenting) ("[D]enying same-sex couples the right to marry... will not encourage
couples who have children to marry or stay married for the benefit of their children.").
90. Some opponents of legal recognition of same-sex relationships have argued that allowing such
legal recognition would lead to a decrease in the numbers of heterosexuals who marry. See, e.g., Good-
ridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 1002 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting); Kmiec,
supra note 21, at 661; Robert H. Bork, The Necessary Amendment, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at
17, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=369. For empirical evidence that
this has not happened in Scandinavia (a favorite example of opponents of same-sex marriage), see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OF FOR WORSE?
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Sixth, there is a further problem facing the accidental procreation ar-
gument. According to this argument, marriage for different-sex couples
provides stability to children that might result from accidental procreation.
For this to be true, the benefits that are associated with marriage need to be
substantial enough to convince some different-sex couples who would not
marry without the benefits associated with marriage to get married and stay
married. While the benefits that are in fact given to different-sex couples
are numerous, 91 the collection of benefits provided to people who marry
seems inadequate incentive to motivate a person or couple to marry when
they are not otherwise inclined to do so. 92 Relatedly, even if some poten-
tially accidental procreators are convinced to marry because of the benefits,
it is not clear that the resulting marriages will be stable. After all, shot-gun
marriages and marriages procured simply for the benefits are likely to
break up.
Seventh, a state has other important interests in marriage besides pro-
viding a stable environment for procreation. As the California Supreme
Court said, "although promoting and facilitating a stable environment for
the procreation and raising of children is unquestionably one of the vitally
important purposes underlying the institution of marriage and the constitu-
tional right to marry .... this right is not confined to, or restrictively de-
fined by, that purpose alone. '93 In Turner v. Safley, which involved
restricting prisoners' opportunities to marry, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that such restrictions were unconstitutional, stating:
Many important attributes of marriage remain.., after taking into ac-
count the limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate marriages, like
others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment.
These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital re-
lationship. In addition, many religions recognize marriage as having
spiritual significance; ... the commitment of marriage may be an exer-
cise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication....
Finally, marital status often is a pre-condition to the receipt of govern-
ment benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., ten-
ancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits
(e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). 94
WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006). For further critique of this argument against
same-sex marriage, see, for example, Carpenter, supra note 64, at 197-202.
91. Seesupranote7l.
92. Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric
of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 28, on file with
authors) ("It's far from clear that a potentially irresponsible procreator contemplating marriage would
look at the package of goodies offered by the state and conclude that marriage is a good idea.").
93. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008).
94. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
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These observations suggest that the accidental procreation argument is
based on an overly simple picture of the purpose of marriage, according to
which there is only one government interest in marriage: protecting the
children of accidental procreation. That picture is not only overly simple, it
is historically and descriptively inaccurate. In short, although providing
stability to children who might result from accidental procreation may be
one of the various purposes that a state has for creating or sustaining mar-
riage, it is hardly the reason a state is interested in marriage. 95
Finally, the contrasting picture of the irresponsibility of heterosexuals
in sexual relationships compared to the unquestioned altruism of gay men
and lesbians who want to be parents and the rock-solid strength of the rela-
tionships of lesbians and gay men who decide to have children is so bizarre
as to reveal that the accidental procreation argument must have been devel-
oped for the very purpose of justifying marriage for different-sex but not
same-sex couples. Not very long ago, a central trope of courts and legal
commentators was that the instability of same-sex relationships made
LGBT people unsuited for marriage, poorly qualified to have custody of
their own children, 96 ineligible to adopt children or be foster parents, 97 and
not deserving of (unsupervised) visitation of their children. 98 Gay men, in
particular, were seen as almost constitutionally unable to form stable rela-
tionships. 99 In light of this recent history, it is hard to take courts seriously
when they talk about how stable same-sex relationships are when children
come into the picture.
Additionally, it is especially ironic that the accidental procreation ar-
gument, which paints this flatteringly idealistic picture of the stability of
same-sex couples who become parents, is embraced in the same briefs as
the "gays make bad parents" argument. This tension between two of their
primary legal arguments suggests that opponents of same-sex marriage are
making any argument they think has a chance of persuading judges, regard-
less of the argument's plausibility, the strength of its premises, or its valid-
ity. When courts embrace both the accidental procreation argument and the
95. See Abrams & Brooks, supra note 92.
96. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d
64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); M.J.P. v. J.G.P, 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va.
1985).
97. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
98. See, e.g., Exparte D.W.W., 717 So .2d 793 (Ala. 1998); Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E. 2d 733
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d
848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
99. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 77, at 306 ("The male taste for variety in sexual partners makes
the prospects for sexual fidelity worse in a homosexual than in a heterosexual marriage.").
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"gays make bad parents" argument, as more than one court has in the past
few years, 100 this create the appearance that these courts began with the
conclusion that the prohibition of same-sex marriage is constitutional and
then looked for any arguments, even conflicting ones, that might justify this
conclusion.
D. The Constitutional Context
The success or failure of arguments for prohibiting same-sex marriage
in court seems to have a great deal to do with the level of constitutional
analysis that a court applies. Questions about the appropriate level of con-
stitutional analysis take place in two different jurisprudential Qontexts:
substantive due process and equal protection. 101 Traditionally, in either
context, a law may be evaluated under either "heightened scrutiny,"-more
specifically, either "strict" or "intermediate" scrutinyl0Z-under which
courts will approach a law with great skepticism, or "rational review," un-
der which courts will approach the law with significant deference. Some
have suggested that this "tiered" approach has evolved and more tiers have
emerged, namely, a "more searching form of rational review" 103 (also
known as "rational review with bite") 104 and/or a weak form of intermedi-
ate scrutiny. 105 Others have suggested that the tiered approach has been
100. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion) ("accidental
procreation" and "gays make bad parents"); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.2d 963, 982-83 (Wash.
2006) ("accidental procreation" and "gays make bad parents").
101. Typically, in the same-sex marriage cases, this examination takes place at the level of the state
constitution, not the United States Constitution, because advocates for legal recognition of same-sex
relationships are careful to frame their legal arguments in terms of state constitutional law. State courts
often say that they interpret claims relating to their State's equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence the same as claims relating to the respective federal constitutional jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9 (discussing how state equal protection clause is "no broader than the
federal provision" and "same analytical framework" used for due process, although state constitutional
analysis may lead to a "different result"). But see, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999)
(distinguishing Vermont's Common Benefits Clause from Equal Protection Clause of U.S. Constitu-
tion).
102. Henceforth, I simplify matters by collapsing the difference between strict scrutiny and inter-
mediate scrutiny. Sex classifications and classifications associated with birth status (that is, whether or
not a person's birth parents were married to each other, sometimes referred to as legitimacy) receive
intermediate scrutiny in contrast to the strict scrutiny that racial, ethnic, and nationality classifications
receive. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Between these extremes of rational basis
review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.").
103. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972).
105. See, e.g., Karen A. Hauser, Comment, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New
Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 911-
16 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court has developed a weak intermediate scrutiny standard-
stronger than rational review, but weaker that the intermediate scrutiny that is applied to sex classifica-
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rejected and replaced--or that the Supreme Court is at least moving in this
direction-with some sort of general balancing test that looks at the type of
classification at issue in a law and the nature of the regulation involved
and, from this, produces the appropriate level of review. 106 I focus here on
the traditional "tiered" approach, but note that the accidental procreation
argument seems unlikely to survive constitutional muster under the afore-
mentioned alternative approaches-that is, under a more searching form of
rational review, a weak form of intermediate scrutiny, or a more general
balancing test to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny-than under
traditional rational review analysis.
Under the rational review test, a law is constitutional so long as it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Typically, rational review is
a very easy standard to satisfy. Statutes that make use of non-suspect classi-
fications and that do not infringe a fundamental right are afforded "a strong
presumption of validity"107 such that a statute will satisfy rational review
"if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification." 108 Although this oft-repeated account
of how rational review works seems to suggest that virtually any law will
satisfy this minimal level of scrutiny, rational-review jurisprudence is more
nuanced than this language suggests, as evidenced by the fact that between
1972 and 1996, in almost 10% of the equal protection cases where rational
review was applied, the Court found the statute at issue to be unconstitu-
tional. 109 This more nuanced formulation of rational review was evident in
Romer v. Evans in which the Supreme Court said that when applying even
"the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation be-
tween the classification adopted and the object to be attained" and that
"[this] search for the link between classification and objective gives sub-
stance to the Equal Protection Clause.""I10
Under both equal protection and due process analysis, some laws
clearly require greater scrutiny than rational review. Under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution and under state constitutional pro-
visions that involve substantive due process rights, a statute that infringes a
tions-for evaluating laws that make use of birth status).
106. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004); Cass
R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 59-61 (1996); see also
Baker, 744 A.2d at 871-78 (applying a form of this balancing test and, thereby, finding the prohibition
on same-sex marriages to be unconstitutional).
107. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
108. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
109. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999).
110. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
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fundamental right is subject to heightened scrutiny. Starting with Loving v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of a funda-
mental right to marry arising from the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."ll State courts typically find a similar right in their
respective state constitutions.1 12 The existence of a fundamental right to
marry does not entail that all restrictions of the right to marry are unconsti-
tutional; rather, "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere
with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed." ' 1 3 Applying due process analysis, various restrictions on the
right to marry have been found unconstitutional.1 14 Federal courts have,
however, upheld some restrictions on this fundamental right, for example,
restrictions on the number of people a person can be married to at the same
time; 115 restrictions on marriage by minors;" l6 and restrictions on prison
guards marrying inmates. 117 Additionally, state courts have also upheld
restrictions on marriage, including, for example, prohibitions on incestuous
marriages 18 and on getting married without being tested for venereal dis-
eases. 119 In general, restrictions on the right to marry will be upheld as
satisfying substantive due process if they can be justified by a significant
state interest. Most courts that have heard constitutional challenges to the
prohibition on same-sex marriage--even courts that ultimately found the
prohibition to be unconstitutional-have found that the prohibition does not
11. See 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning Virginia law prohibiting interracial marriages because,
inter alia, it violated the fundamental right to marry); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
(overturning Missouri prison regulations restricting marriage for prisoners on ground it violated the
fundamental right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (overturning Wisconsin law
putting restrictions on marriage for people in arrears on child support obligations on ground that it
violated the fundamental right to marry).
112. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419-20 (Cal. 2008); Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571, 603 (Md. 2007).
113. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
114. See cases cited supra note 111.
115. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878) (upholding polygamy prose-
cution); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding polygamy laws); Bronson v.
Swensen, 394 F.Supp.2d 1329 (C.D. Utah 2005) (same).
116. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (SD.N.Y. 1981) (upholding parental consent
requirement for marriages by minors against due process and equal protection challenges).
117. See, e.g., Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding rule that prohibited prison
guards from becoming socially involved with prisoners against challenge that it violated right to marry).
118. See, e.g., State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); State ex rel. Miesner v.
Geile, 747 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). But see Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (strik-
ing down-without reaching the issue of the fundamental right to marry-state law against incestuous
marriages as applied to adopted siblings).
119. See, e.g., Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966 (Wis. 1914). But see T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F.
Supp. 110 (D. Utah 1993) (striking down-without reaching the issue of the fundamental right to
marry-state law prohibiting persons with AIDS from marrying on grounds that it violated Americans
with Disabilities Act).
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violate due process. 120
In the equal protection context, the question is whether the law at issue
makes use of a suspect classification or whether the law restricts a funda-
mental right. If a law makes use of a suspect classification or involves a
fundamental right, then heightened scrutiny is applied. When heightened
scrutiny is applied, the use of a suspect classification in the law or the law's
infringement of the fundamental right must be "necessary to the accom-
plishment of some permissible state objective." 121 Although it sometimes
seems like strict scrutiny is always fatal and that intermediate scrutiny is
basically the same as strict scrutiny, 122 neither is always the case. 123
Some courts have applied heightened scrutiny to the prohibition on
marriage between people of the same sex, 124 while others have applied
rational review. 125 Every court that has embraced the accidental procreation
120. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 Cl, at *4
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), superceded by amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006). But see,
e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (finding failure to permit same-sex couples to
marry violates the fundamental right to marry); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
953 (Mass. 2003) (noting equality and due process provisions of state constitution significantly overlap
in context of analyzing failure to permit same-sex couples to marry and finding that prohibitions on
same-sex marriage are unconstitutional).
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (articulating the intermediate
scrutiny test for sex classifications in a manner that brings it very close to the strict scrutiny test for race
classifications); id. at 571-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for slippage from intermediate
scrutiny to strict scrutiny in relation to sex classifications).
123. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' . . . When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow
tailoring' test."); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that educational benefits
related to diversity are compelling enough interests to justify considerations of race even under strict
scrutiny); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (holding affirmative action plan involv-
ing race classifications constitutional under strict scrutiny because narrowly tailored). Regarding the
difference between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001)
(upholding in the face of intermediate scrutiny law that provided significantly more stringent require-
ments for obtaining U.S. citizenship for non-marital children of men who are U.S. citizens as compared
to non-marital children of women who are U.S citizens); see also cases cited supra note 72.
124. See, e.g., Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *5-*6 (applying heightened scrutiny because marriage
involves sex classifications and fundamental right to choose life partner); Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at
432-34, 442 (applying heightened scrutiny under both due process-because marriage is a fundamental
right-and under equal protection-because sexual-orientation classifications warrant strict scrutiny);
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476 (Conn. 2008) (applying heightened scrutiny
under equal protection because sexual-orientation classifications warrant intermediate scrutiny); Baehr,
852 P.2d at 67 (applying heightened scrutiny under equal protection because marriage laws make use of
sex classifications); Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d. 862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 211-12
(applying heightened scrutiny to marriage laws under the first paragraph of the state's constitution); see
also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878 (Vt. 1999) (applying heightened scrutiny under Common Bene-
fits Clause of state constitution).
125. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 629 (Md. 2007); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961
(applying rational review because it was not necessary to consider arguments for applying heightened
scrutiny since "the [marriage] statute does not survive rational basis review."); Hernandez v. Robles,
20091
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
argument has done so in the context of applying rational review. In con-
trast, some of the courts that found the failure to allow same-sex couples to
marry is unconstitutional have analyzed and rejected the accidental pro-
creation argument in the context of applying heightened scrutiny, 126 while
some of the judges who have found that their state constitutions require the
legal recognition of same-sex marriages have done so applying rational
review. 127
Courts that have embraced the accidental procreation argument seem
to be applying the weakest version of rational review, saying a legislature
could believe that prohibiting same-sex marriage is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of providing a stable environment for children that
result from accidental procreation. Even though such courts concede that
the law in question does not closely fit with the state interest that allegedly
justifies state law, these courts have held that the fit is close enough to sat-
isfy rational review. The concurring opinion in Hernandez, for example,
said:
[T]he marriage classification is imperfect and could be viewed in some
respects as overinclusive or underinclusive since not all opposite-sex
couples procreate, opposite-sex couples who cannot procreate may
marry, and opposite-sex partners can and do procreate outside of mar-
riage. It is also true that children being raised in same-sex households
would derive economic and social benefits if their parents could marry.
But under rational basis review, the classification need not be perfectly
precise or narrowly tailored-all that is required is a reasonable connec-
tion between the classification and the interest at issue. 128
The Indiana appellate court in Morrison made a similar point:
A reasonable legislative classification is not to be condemned merely be-
cause it is not framed with such mathematical nicety as to include all
within the reason of the classification and to exclude all others. There
was a rational basis for the legislature to draw the line between opposite-
sex couples, who as a generic group are biologically capable of repro-
ducing, and same-sex couples, who are not. This is true, regardless of
whether there are some opposite-sex couples that wish to marry but one
or both partners are physically incapable of reproducing. 129
According to the Morrison court and both the Hernandez plurality 30
855 N.E.2d 1, 6, II (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 980
(Wash. 2006).
126. See Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 431-33; see also Lewis, 908 A.2d at 230 (Poritz, C.J., con-
curring and dissenting).
127. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 30-34 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
128. 855 N.E.2d at 22 (Graffeo, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also id. at 7-8 (plurality
opinion).
129. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Collins v. Day, 644
N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994)).
130. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7 (plurality opinion).
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and concurrence, the prohibition of same-sex marriages survives rational
review even though the classification at issue-that is, only different-sex
couples can marry-and the objective that is supposed to justify it-that is,
providing stable family environments for children--do not fit. To put the
point another way, these cases hold that the laws that prohibit same-sex
couples from marrying satisfy rational review even though the classifica-
tion in such marriage laws, which distinguishes same-sex couples and dif-
ferent-sex couples, is both over-inclusive (because some couples who
cannot accidentally procreate are allowed to marry) and under-inclusive
(because some couples with children who may need the stability that mar-
riage provides are not allowed to marry).
Judges who find that the prohibition of same-sex marriages fails to
pass constitutional muster argue that, even applying rational review, the
link between the law and its objective is too tenuous. The dissent in Her-
nandez makes this point as follows:
Defendants primarily assert an interest in encouraging procreation within
marriage. But while encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry before
they have children is certainly a legitimate interest of the State, the ex-
clusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in no way furthers this
interest.... [T]he statutory classification here-which prohibits only
same-sex couples, and no one else, from marrying-is so grossly under-
inclusive and overinclusive as to make the asserted rationale in promot-
ing procreation "impossible to credit."1 31
The Goodridge court makes a similar point as follows:
The "marriage is procreation" argument singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms
that difference into the essence of legal marriage.... [T]he marriage re-
striction impermissibly "identifies persons by a single trait and then de-
nies them protection across the board.". . . There is thus no rational
relationship between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth's prof-
fered goal. 132
The core issue that separates the two contrasting analyses of marriage
laws that prohibit all same-sex couples from marrying is the strength of the
link between the scope of this prohibition and the goal of providing chil-
dren with a stable environment. Quite possibly no judge thinks that this link
is perfect. Further, a few judges seem to claim that legislatures actually
were thinking about providing stability for children who result from acci-
dental procreation when the marriage laws were drafted. 133 As the above
131. Id. at 30-31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-63 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
133. See, e.g., Morrison, 855 N.E.2d at 30 ("[O]pposite-sex marriage is recognized and supported
by law in large part to encourage 'responsible procreation' by opposite-sex couples.").
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quotations from Hernandez and Morrison show, some judges think that the
link between the scope of the prohibition and the claimed goal is close
enough for the law to survive rational review. 134
For reasons I discussed in the previous section, the accidental procrea-
tion argument is quite weak: it is in various ways over-inclusive and under-
inclusive, it is based on a dramatically incomplete picture of the past and
present purpose of marriage, an absurdly idealized account of the lives of
people who have children as the result of planning, and a dramatic overes-
timation of the strength of the incentives that marriage provides. These
infirmities would render this argument unconstitutional if it were offered as
a justification for prohibiting the legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships under heightened scrutiny, weak intermediate scrutiny, rational re-
view with bite, or under an approach that uses a balancing test to determine
the appropriate amount of scrutiny. The question remains whether marriage
laws that only allow different-sex couples to marry are a reasonable means
for achieving the goal of providing stability to children, in particular, chil-
dren who might result from accidental procreation by different-sex couples.
That question is what divides courts that applied rational review analysis to
marriage laws that allow only different-sex couples to marry and that con-
sider the protection of children resulting from accidental procreation as the
state interest in such laws.
My aim here is not to advocate for the legal recognition of same-sex
relationships or for a particular account of the appropriate level of constitu-
tional scrutiny that should be applied to either laws that make use of sex-
ual-orientation classifications or that restrict the access of same-sex couples
to marriage. Rather, my aim is to assess the accidental procreation argu-
ment. Although I find this argument to be quite weak, some courts, apply-
ing the weakest form of rational review, have found that protecting the
children that result from accidental procreation to be a justification for
prohibiting same-sex marriage that is strong enough to pass constitutional
muster.
In Part I, I argued that the standard argument from procreation-
although accepted by every court that heard a challenge to prohibitions on
same-sex marriage in the 1970s and although accepted by some courts
today-is generally rejected today. In fact, many states have refused to
make the standard argument from procreation when defending their mar-
riage laws, finding it too weak. The accidental procreation argument has
the same infirmities as the standard procreation argument (as well as sev-
134. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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eral additional problems). Both arguments have problems with under- and
over-inclusiveness and both problematically embrace an overly narrow
account of the role of marriage. In light of these similarities, it seems that
the accidental procreation argument should, like the standard argument
from procreation, eventually wither under both empirical and logical analy-
sis, and subsequently, be rejected by states as plausible justifications of
prohibiting same-sex marriages and rejected by courts as not satisfying
even the weaker form of rational review.
CONCLUSION
Since the 1970s, same-sex marriage litigation has had to confront
various attempts to link marriage to procreation as part of the justification
for excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Courts in the 1970s univer-
sally accepted the link between marriage and procreation that formed the
crucial premise of the standard argument from procreation. Today this ar-
gument gets mixed results. The accidental procreation argument attempts to
avoid the widely recognized problems with the standard argument from
procreation by focusing on real differences between same-sex and differ-
ent-sex couples: marriage does not uniquely and necessarily involve pro-
creation, but marriage may provide a strong chance at stability for the
children of different-sex couples that result from accidental procreation.
Generally, the accidental procreation argument fails to provide a viable
alternative to the standard argument for procreation. Some courts have,
however, found that it satisfies rational review. Advocates of the legal rec-
ognition of same-sex relationships can undermine the accidental procrea-
tion argument if they can convince courts to ratchet up the scrutiny applied
to laws that prohibit same-sex marriages even just a bit. Alternatively, they
can try to show that the proffered justification of the same-sex marriage
ban provided by the accidental procreation argument fails to satisfy even
rational review. Given the similarities between the accidental procreation
argument and the standard argument from procreation, there is reason for
optimism that both attempts to link marriage and procreation to justify the
ban on same-sex marriage will eventually fail.
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